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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
industry. It would afford him much security to know that in the event of
trouble his supplier would rush to his aid by cutting the price to him.
However, if he wants to retain his identity and independence he should
be made to shift for himself. By restricting the supplier in his methods of
aiding his retail customers competition will be increased in that the retailer
will have to improve his service and operations in order to attract the
motorist. Knowing that he must stand or fall on his own merits the
independent will compete with more vigor and will benefit in the knowl-
edge that his success is his own. The consumer will get better products
and improved service. Due to the peculiar focal point of competition in
the oil industry, an exception should be carved out of the Robinson-
Patman Act. But, until Congress so acts, the Court will maintain the
strict interpretation of the law as it is now written.
John J. Walsh
CIVIL PROCEDURE-FEDERAL VENUE STATUTE-REQUIREMENTS
SATISFIED IF CORPORATION DOING BUSINESS WITHIN DISTRICT
WHEN CAUSE OF ACTION AROSE.
L'Heureux v. Central American Airways Flying Service, Inc.
(D. Md. 1962)
Plaintiff, a citizen of Connecticut, brought this action in negligence
against defendant, a Kentucky corporation, in the federal district court
for the district of Maryland. The defendant had operated a training
program for pilots in Maryland but did not qualify to do business under
the Maryland statutes.' Plaintiff alleged that while on a training flight
he was injured when the plane crashed in Maryland as a result of the
negligence of defendant's employees. This action was brought three years
later. The defendant sought dismissal on the ground of improper venue,
contending that 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) should be interpreted to require
that a defendant corporation be residing within the district where it is
being sued at the time the suit is brought and not merely when the cause
of action arose. The district court denied defendant's motion; holding that
the venue requirements for federal district courts were satisfied by a
showing that the defendant had been doing business in the district at the
time the cause of action arose; but, even if it were necessary that the
corporation be doing business within the district when the claim was
filed, it had waived its objection. L'Heureux v. Central American Airways
Flying Service, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 713 (D. Md. 1962).
1. MD. ANN. CODE, art. 23, § 90-95 (1957).
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Whether a corporation must be doing business within the district
at the time the action is brought to satisfy the venue requirements for
federal district courts is a matter of federal law.2 The relevant section
of the federal venue statute for district courts 'states that "[a] corporation
may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed
to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be
regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes."'3
Literally, it appears that if a corporation were not doing business when
the cause was brought it could not be sued there. It certainly would
have been a simple matter for Congress to have used "was" instead of
"is" if it had intended a different meaning. It should be noted that
Congress did, in fact, make this distinction in enacting the venue
statute for patent purposes. 4 In Sunbury Wire Rope Mfg. Co. v. United
States Steel Corp.,5 this precise question was discussed by the Third
Circuit in an antitrust context. In considering both the federal venue
statute and § 12 of the Clayton Act,6 the court stated:
It is true that at the time the cause of action asserted in this case is
said to have arisen, Roebling [defendant] was registered in Pennsyl-
vania as a foreign corporation and maintained its principal Penn-
sylvania office in Philadelphia within the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. But before the present suit was filed, this New
Jersey corporation had terminated its registration and activities in
Pennsylvania. Therefore, the present choice of forum does not satisfy
the venue requirements of the Clayton Act or Section 1391 of Title
28 and this action cannot be maintained unless Roebling has waived
venue and submitted to this kind of suit in Eastern Pennsylvania.7
Professor Moore is in agreement with this analysis.8 Decisions inter-
preting § 12 of the Clayton Act are helpful in attempting to define
2. Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 66 S. Ct. 242 (1946);
McCoy v. Siler, 205 F.2d 498 (3d Cir. 1953). In Rensing v. Turner Aviation Corp.,
166 F. Supp. 790, 794 (N.D. Ill. 1958), the court stated: "It has been consistently
held that venue in Federal courts is not affected or limited by State legislation,
but is wholly a matter of congressional control and legislation." See also State
Public School Bldg. Authority v. Maryland Casualty Co., 127 F. Supp. 902 (M.D.
Pa. 1955).
3.38 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1958).
4. 62 Stat. 936 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1400 (1958).
5. 230 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1956).
6. Clayton Act § 12, 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1958): "Any suit,
action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation may be brought
not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any
district wherein it may be found or transacts business." It is to be noted that the
venue provision of the Clayton Act is essentially the same as 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (c) as
far as doing business is concerned.
7. Supra note 5 at 512-13.
8. 1 MOORe, FrDERAL PRAcTict 1493 (2d ed. 1961):
[S]uppose a foreign corporation's license to do business in a state is
revoked or expires, the corporation ceases doing business in the state but re-
mains liable to suit on causes of action growing out of the business done by it,
and process can be served on the state's statutory agent. In such an actior.
brought in a federal court of that state, the venue would not be proper under§ 1391 (c) unless the jurisdictional basis of the action was diversity and the
action was brought in the plaintiff's district.
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§ 1391 (c) since the two are quite similar. Section 12 of the Clayton Act
requires a finding that the corporation "transacts business" within the
district;" § 1391(c) makes it necessary that the defendant be "doing
business." In Gem Corrugated Box Co. v. Mead Corp.,10 the plaintiff
alleged that the venue provisions of the Clayton Act were satisfied if
defendant had transacted business in the district at the time of the alleged
violation and that the latter's withdrawal prior to the commencement of
suit would not affect the plaintiff's position for venue purposes. The
court rejected this contention, stating:
While it is clear that section 12 was designed to broaden the choice
of forum available in anti-trust actions, nothing in the statutes in-
dicates a congressional intent to depart from the usual temporal
reference, i.e., the date the complaint is filed with the court . . .
Therefore, I cannot accept as a rule of general application plaintiffs'
contention that it is sufficient to show that the acts complained of
arose out of defendant's business transactions in the chosen forum
prior to the commencement of legal proceedings."
On the other hand, Ross-Bart Port Theatre, Inc. v. Eagle Lion Films,
Inc.,1 2 calls for a contrary result. The defendant contended that it was
no longer within the district when the action was filed although it had
previously done business there. The court held:
At this stage we have only to consider if total absence of this de-
fendant from Virginia at the institution of the action precludes ser-
vice of process under Section 12 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 22.
In deciding that it does not, the Court holds that the sworn charges
of the combination and conspiracy in this district, and the commission
of acts in the district pursuant thereto directly or by co-conspirators
admittedly present here, sustain venue in the eastern district of
Virginia. 13
'However, the court emphasized, and, in fact, seemed to base its
decision upon dicta in United States v. Scophony Corp.14 The court
said: "[Section 12 of the Clayton Act intended that) a foreign corpora-
tion no longer could come to a district, perpetrate there the injuries
outlawed, and then by retreating ... to its headquarters defeat or delay
.the retribution due."' 5 However, the evidence showed that the defendant
actually was transacting business at the time of the institution of the
suit. In this regard, the court noted:
But there can be no question of the existence of "jurisdiction,"
in the sense of venue under § 12, over Scophony in the Southern
9. Supra note 6.
10. 189 F. Supp. 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
11. Id. at 586.
12. 140 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Va. 1954).
13. Id. at 403.
14. 333 U.S. 795, 68 S. Ct. 855 (1947).
15. Id. at 808, 68 S. Ct. at 862.
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district of New York. To say that on the facts presented Scophony
transacted no business 'of any substantial character' there during the
period covered by institution of the suit and the times of serving
process would be to disregard the . . . 'transacts business' [standard]
in the venue provision. 16
The Court added that "Scophony ... was 'transacting business' of a substan-
tial character' in the New York district at the times of service, so as to
establish venue there . . .,17
The approach of the court in the Ross-Bart Port Theatre case and in
the instant decision has a certain appeal since the more restrictive inter-
pretation may allow a defendant corporation to escape liability within
the district for a tort committed there. Ordinarily, however, the corpora-
tion could still be sued wherever it is found to be doing business. Al-
though this may sometimes be inconvenient for the injured plaintiff, it
should be remembered that the statute is concerned with the convenience
of both plaintiff and defendant.1 8 The most natural reading of the section
leads to the conclusion that Congress determined that in such situations
the possible inconvenience to the defendant corporation outweighs the dis-
comfort to the complainant. The United States Supreme Court, in inter-
preting the venue provision of the Clayton Act, pointed out that "Congress
was not willing to give plaintiffs free rein to haul defendants hither and
yon at their caprice."' 9 Therefore, considering all these factors, the most
consistent interpretation of the statute does not support the present court's
finding.
However, the court held alternatively that defendant had waived his
right to question proper venue. Under certain circumstances, this right
may certainly be waived. In Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Ship Building
Corp.,20 the defendant corporation had qualified to do business in New
York and had appointed a resident agent to receive service of process.
The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, found that since
there had been an "actual consent by Bethlehem to be sued in the courts
of New York, federal as well as state,"' the corporation had waived its
venue rights. (Emphasis added.) In Knott Corp. v. Furman,22 it was
held that if a corporation did business in a state in defiance of the state's
licensing laws it waived its venue rights not only for the time during which
it was doing business but for causes of action arising out of that business
after the corporation had moved out.
16. Id. at 810, 68 S. Ct. at 863.
17. Id., at 818, 68 S. Ct. at 866.
18. Rensing v. Turner Aviation Corp., supra note 2.
19. United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 573, 588, 68 S. Ct. 1169,
1177 (1948). See also Abrams v. Bendix Home Appliances, 96 F. Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y.
1951).
20. 308 U.S. 165, 60 S. Ct. 153 (1939).
21. Id at 175, 60 S. Ct. at 158.
22. 163 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1947).
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We think it clear that with respect to waiving the provisions of the
federal venue statute there can be no distinction between the consent
to suit and service of process implied from doing business in the
state and that arising out of appointment of a process agent, so that
where a foreign corporation has given such consent as subjects it to
suit in the courts of the state, the same consent subjects it to suit in
the federal courts there sitting if the elements of federal jurisdiction
are present. 23 (Emphasis added.)
In Neirbo, actual consent was found; but in Knott, the Fourth Circuit
considered mere implied consent to be enough. However, in Olberding
v. Illinois Central Ry. Co.,24 the United States Supreme Court sharply
cut short any trend which might have been developing toward a broad
interpretation. The plaintiff contended that in light of a Kentucky
statute which declared that one using highways of that state impliedly
consented to suit therein, the defendant had waived his venue rights.
Justice Frankfurter disagreed, stating: "[T]o conclude from this holding
that the motorist, who never consented to anything and whose consent is al-
together immaterial, has actually agreed to be sued and has thus waived his
federal venue rights is surely to move in the world of Alice in Wonderland."2 5
Thus, the concept of implied consent was rejected in such a situation. The
rule of the Olberding case has been applied to corporations as well as
to individuals.26 Three years later, the Third Circuit passed upon this
same problem in Sunbury Wire Rope Mfg. Co. v. United States Steel
Co. 27 The court found that even though the defendant corporation had
moved out of the state before suit was instituted, by signing a withdrawal
certificate consenting to service within the state in certain cases, it had
waived its venue rights. The decision does not seem inconsistent with
Olberding since the defendant did actually consent to suit within the state,
albeit for a time after it had left the jurisdiction. In the present case there
was no written actual consent of any kind. However, the facts in the
instant situation are distinguishable from those in Olberding. It could
be argued that the United States Supreme Court found no consent to be
sued within the district in question in the latter case since "long-arm"
motorist statutes are based on the state's police powers and in no way
involve actual or implied consent on the part of the corporation. In the
present case, as in Knott, it could be said that the basis of the power of
the state was an implied consent by the defendant since a state may
impose any restrictions it wishes upon a corporation's doing business within
its borders. However, the approach of the Court in Olberding strongly
suggests a different result. The Court there warned: "The requirement
of venue is specific and unambiguous; it is not one of those vague
23. Id. at 204.
24. 346 U.S. 338, 74 S. Ct. 83 (1953).
25. Id. at 341, 74 S. Ct. at 85-86.
26. Lied Motor Car Co. v. Maxey, 208 F.2d 672 (8th Cir. 1953).
27. Supra note 5. For a similar rationale, see I Moo" , FEDSRAI, PRACTICZ 1494(2d ed. 1961).
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